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Eliot’s resistance to theory
1 “If, as James Thomson observed, ‘lips only sing when they cannot kiss,’ it may also be
that poets only talk when they cannot sing.” This is the conclusion of Eliot’s series of
lectures delivered at Harvard University during the winter of 1932-33 and published as
The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (Eliot, 1950 156). In many of his essays, Eliot tried
to define his poetics and to set his aesthetic standards. This declaration is a way for him
to question the validity of his own attempt to theorize about poetry, in a dismissive
gesture meant to reassert his identity as a poet. But this declaration, along with the line
of thought developed in these lectures, also suggests a clear separation between critical
discourse and poetic writing. “Talk” appears as a supplement to poetry, as a provisional
outlet when the poet’s ability to “sing” fails him or when the explanation forced upon
him by a reader in need of clarification leads him to resort to discourse. This statement
could also imply that, as far as theory is concerned, only “talks” should be taken into
account and that “the rest”– poetry – “is silence”, or a pure song whose capacity to
affect  the senses should be enough to silence the mind.  But  why should the terms
“theory” and “song” be antithetical? If Eliot’s essays have largely contributed to his
reputation as a critic, is it fair to separate “the man who [sings]” and “the mind which
[thinks]”1,  or  to  deny  the  existence  of  theory  or  aesthetic  considerations  as  an
undertone, or under-tune, of his poetry? The question of the relation between thought
and feeling in Eliot’s poetics is too complex to be thoroughly analysed in this article.
This concern can be traced back to Eliot’s early training in philosophy and his rejection
of F. H. Bradley’s concept of “immediate experience,” the postulate of the immediately
given which allows him to elaborate his theory of knowledge. According to Bradley,
immediate feeling is divided at a later stage by thought and analysis. If Bradley himself
presented the existence of such an immediate experience as doubtful, Eliot asserted
that such a stage of “non-relational experience does not exist” (Eliot, 1964 27). “This is
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because for Eliot,” Manju Jain writes, “there is no stage of consciousness at which we do
not find feeling and thought together […] whereas Bradley stresses that there is no
thought without feeling, Eliot emphasizes that there is no feeling without thought.”
(Jain, 1992 207) Therefore, the feeling that goes into writing poetry or the feeling in
which writing itself has originated is always already marked by thought and analysis.
And the partition of their respective modes of inscription would be as irrelevant as the
attempt to circumscribe their respective fields of action in the consciousness of the
poet at the time of composition. 
2 Composition is not only a reunion between the poet, his feelings his thoughts and the
object he wants to create; it also includes the deep awareness of the literary works of
the past and the felt necessity to constantly interact with them. But such an interaction
does not require the use of the openly discursive mode; it takes place in poetic writing
itself. In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot tried to define what composition
meant for him and insisted on the notion of tradition as a necessary constituent of the
poet’s artistic awareness. The “discourse” developed in most of his essays has led many
readers to consider Eliot as a traditional modernist, attached to the past and to the
monumental dimension of literature. Yet his poetry, be it openly discursive as in Four
Quartets, or apparently devoid of any programmatic dimension, as in “The Love Song of
J. Alfred Prufrock” or “Portrait of a Lady”, seems to offer another kind of theoretical
discourse. 
3 Eliot’s stance on theory is actually very ambivalent. In the last of the lectures delivered
at  Harvard  he  acknowledges,  or  pretends  to  acknowledge, his  own limits  as  far  as
theory is concerned: “The extreme of theorising about the nature of poetry, the essence
of poetry if there is any, belongs to the study of aesthetics and is no concern of the poet
or of a critic with my limited qualifications.” (Eliot, 1950 149-50) In his essay on Hamlet,
Eliot, though a passionate critic himself, blames that “most dangerous type of critic,”
who projects his/her own emotions onto works of art:
[…]  the  critic  with  a  mind  which  is  naturally  of  the  creative  order,  but  which
through  some  weakness  in  creative  power  exercises  itself  in  criticism  instead.
These  minds  often  find  in  Hamlet  a  vicarious  existence  for  their  own  artistic
realization. Such a mind had Goethe, who made of Hamlet a Werther; and such had
Coleridge, who made of Hamlet a Coleridge. (Eliot, 1951 141)
4 Such provocative debunking of great authors is part of Eliot’s game and should not be
taken at face-value; it may not be more than the falsely naïve way and fairly innocuous
tool of the zealous grown-up schoolboy Eliot sometimes impersonates in his essays.
This remark leads us to think that the only kind of valid criticism a text can produce is
its  own manifestation  as  text;  the  critic  himself  is  only  supposed  to  reveal  such  a
manifestation. 
 
“Time to murder and create”: tradition, memory,
intertextuality
5 In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot stresses the importance of the writer’s
awareness  of  the  past,  of  tradition  and of  the  “historical  sense,”  “indispensable  to
anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year”. These remarks
have contributed to build Eliot’s repute as a staunch defender of tradition: 
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[…] and the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the
past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely
with his  own generation in his  bones,  but  with a  feeling that  the whole  of  the
literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own
country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. (Eliot,
1951 14)
6 This awareness of the past and of tradition goes along with the impossibility for the
individual poet to be meaningful in himself:
No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his
appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You
cannot value him alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the
dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical, criticism. […]
what  happens  when  a  new  work  of  art  is created  is  something  that  happens
simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it. The existing monuments
form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the
new (the really new) work of art among them. (Eliot, 1951 15)
7 The insistence on “the existing monuments” of literature, of the “literature of Europe,”
has led other modernists advocating another type of modernism to consider Eliot as the
enemy they loved to hate.  William Carlos Williams thus wrote in his  Autobiography:
“Critically Eliot returned us to the classroom just at the moment when I felt that we
were on the point of an escape to matters much closer to the essence of a new art form
itself–rooted in the locality which should give it fruit. I knew at once that in certain
ways I was most defeated.” (Williams, 1967 174) But we cannot take Eliot’s insistence on
the past as simply an allegiance to tradition, knowing that he keeps underlying the
interconnection  between  the  works  of  the  past  and  every  new  work  that  is  being
produced. If Eliot, as William Carlos Williams feared, “returned [him] to the classroom,”
it  may  have  been  with  the  intention  not  so  much  to  preserve  the  works  of  those
canonical European writers he admires so much, such as Dante, Shakespeare or the
Metaphysical Poets, but to play with them and distort them, not so much to sit silently
and listen to the “quiet-voiced elders” teach him a lesson, but to ransack the place. 
8 It would be interesting, then, to compare these statements from “Tradition and the
Individual  Talent” with Eliot’s  poetics  of  dispossession as  it  develops in his  poetry,
notably in Four Quartets. Another statement near the end of his essay encourages such a
confrontation. There Eliot deals with “the métier of poetry” and with the task of the
poet:  “What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to
something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice,
a continual extinction of personality.” (Eliot,  1951 17) The notion of “self-sacrifice,”
even if it is linked with the concept of impersonality inherent in Eliot’s poetics, may be
read along different lines if we are willing to think to the tune of his poetry.
9 Eliot’s poetics first invites us to consider memory as monumental memory, meant to
preserve and strengthen the authority of the works Eliot invokes and of his own works,
even  if  remembering  always  entails  revaluating  and  rereading.  Yet,  the  notion  of
authority as it appears through his poetic practice is made highly problematic not only
by the fact that a poem like The Waste Land is itself the product of a collaboration with
Ezra Pound whose work on Eliot’s text has invalidated, from the start, the conception of
a single, stable authority, but also by the disseminating effect of intertextuality. The
questioning of authority performed by modernism either by re-centering language on
itself, with Gertrude Stein among others, choosing common rather than noble objects
(here we can think of William Carlos Williams), inserting foreign languages, erasing or
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duplicating punctuation marks (with Pound or Cummings), turning the poet into a rule-
breaker trespassing the laws of syntax, is also to be found in the poems of Eliot that
have most contributed to build his reputation as a “father” of high modernism, that is,
as a figure of authority. Beyond the quality of the literary, cultural and semantic echoes
they  always  constitute,  quotations  are  also,  if  not  primarily,  considered  by  him as
poetic material, fragments of sound, stretches of poetic matter with a proper shape and
density  that  the  poet  will  try  to  weave  into  his  own  poetic  tissue,  or  rework  and
remodel so as to complete the fusion of the supposedly original with the secondary.
Eliot distorts certain quotations according to his poetic needs. To give but one example:
the words of Pia de’ Tolomei in Dante’s Purgatorio are adapted to the speech of the
modern Thames daughter in “The Fire Sermon,” herself a modern version of Wagner’s
Rhine-daughters  in  Götterdämmerung,  the  last  opera of  The Ring Cycle.  “Siena  mi  fé,
disfecemi Maremma”–which was also the title of one of the thirteen poems composing
the first part of Pound’s Hugh Selwyn Mauberley (1920)–becomes “Highbury bore me.
Richmond and Kew /Undid me.” (Eliot, 1974 63-4). In Eliot’s poem, the identity of the
speaker remains unknown. The female voice seems to be pondering over her present
situation and state of mind after a supposedly traumatic event whose circumstances,
causes and consequences remain obscure (“My feet are at Moorgate, and my heart /
Under my feet.”). Linking this voice to both Pia de’ Tolomei and the Rhine daughters
gives it different layers of personality and inscribes it in a larger feminine experience,
even if the common points between them all are difficult to grasp given the lack of
substance  that  prevents  the  feminine  voice  here  from  turning  into  a  figure.
Interpretation is far from prevented, though; we could, for instance, surmise that what
links those female “figures” is the fact that they have been unable to protect what they
were supposed to protect, be it their own honor and integrity, or the Rhine/Thames
gold. Yet the dissemination of the references through their relocation and modification
prevents any stable interpretation, and the force of this rewriting may lie precisely in
the impossibility to posit any definite and ultimate linkage. The passage from Dante’s
Italian to modern English, from the exotic-sounding names of Siena and Maremma to
familiar names of London boroughs, stations and suburban towns is a form of demotion
whose poetic counterpart may be found in the loss of the beautiful mirror-effect of
Dante’s  line:  [ena]-[mi]-[fe]/[fe]-[mi]-[ema],  replaced  with  the  far  more  simple
repetition of the sound [i:]  and the alliterations “bury”, “bore”, “me”, “Richmond”,
“me”.  Eliot’s  modified  quotation  carries  the  weight  of  a  literary  memory  which  is
constantly reprocessing its materials and adapting them to the immediate social and
textual context. Pia de’ Tolomei was unfairly charged with adultery by her husband,
imprisoned then allegedly thrown from a window of her castle, in order for him to be
able to marry his lover. The figure had been made famous by Donizetti’s opera in 1837
and Rossetti’s painting in the late 1860’s. Eliot’s poem presents a gradual process of
depersonalisation, from this singular legendary figure to the hypothetically stranded
modern Rhine/Thames daughter whose impersonal voice can be heard here. The ring
of  multi-layered  references  allows  Eliot  to  give  some  emotional  potential  to  his
impersonal voices. The stolen material is not meant to adorn or complement his own
text but rather to reveal a lack of authority and substantiality itself constitutive of the
modernist  aesthetics.  Such  a  revelation  is  made  possible  by  the  confrontation  of
materials at the heart of the intertextual practice. 
10 Contrary to what we might expect, glorification may not be the leading principle of
Eliot’s active relation to the old monuments of literature. If Eliot’s essays betray his
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admiration for the great European writers who form his personal pantheon, admiration
turns into an active process. His compulsive use of quotations sometimes resembles
kleptomania. But Eliot’s stolen pieces, however disguised they may be, are, most of the
time, recognizable and meant to be recognized by his ideal, educated reader, which
places him at the frontier between reverence and defiance, between homage and bold
appropriation. Richard Shusterman insists on the dynamic nature of Eliot’s conception
of tradition, comparing it to Gadamer’s:
Like Eliot’s, Gadamer’s concept of tradition is globally comprehensive rather than
elitely,  aesthetically  restricted.  It  is,  moreover,  immanently  socially  real  and
changing  rather  than  transcendentally  ideal  and  timeless.  Largely  unconscious,
tradition is mainly transmitted through social breeding and imbibed through basic
linguistic  training  though  some  of  its  most  conscious  achievements  demand  a
specially conscious effort to understand them. Tradition contains both good and
bad, and requires constant criticism and change to keep it vital and worthy. […] For
Gadamer, as for Eliot, tradition–being inextricably linked with language–constitutes
the  preconditioned  and  preconditioning  matrix  and  medium  of  our  thought.
(Davidson, 1999 32)
11 Admiration has to do with the way one looks at something or someone. “[C]onstant
criticism  and  change”  can  also  be  thought  to  constitute  a  peculiar  modality  of
admiration that implies active involvement. Re-appropriating poetic fragments, with
the  risk  of  altering  their  connotations  by  giving  them  new  contexts,  may  be  the
ultimate  form  of  admiration,  namely  the  attempt  to  keep  those  works  alive,  by
transplanting some of  their  cells  and allowing them to develop on the new,  fertile
ground of a poetry still in the making. This attitude towards old literary works, through
the distortion of some of their components, goes along with a relative indifference to
the preservation of his own works if preservation means the stultification and oblivion
born of an excess of praise and deference. Didn’t he once say that The Waste Land was
“just a piece of rhythmical grumbling”2? (Valerie Eliot, 1971 1) We can feel a perpetual
self-dispossession at work in his poetic practice. The poems remember themselves, and
the poet, writing, remembers himself writing. But what he remembers is the transience
of the creative moment and the unstable, shifting nature of words and phrases, as in
“Burnt Norton”:
[…] Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still. […] (Eliot, 1974 182)
12 His past work is always considered as “work in progress” to some extent, for “[t]he
pattern is new in every moment.” This line wrenched from “East Coker” can be applied
to the creative process itself. Poetry as sensible object is always already dispensable
and outdated:
[…] Last season’s fruit is eaten
And the fullfed beast shall kick the empty pail.
For last year’s words belong to last year’s language
And next year’s words await another voice. (Eliot, 1974 205)
13 In his own intertextual practice, the reference in itself does not really matter. The text
is  reduced to  a  trace  constantly  retracing itself,  which echoes  what  Eliot  writes  in
“Tradition and the Individual Talent,” namely the fact that the works of the past are
altered by the works of the present.  This “idea” as it  incarnates itself  in his poetic
practice leads us further than the statement about tradition in his essay. The essay
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relies much on rhetoric, yet such a statement also sounds metaphorical. This is at least
how it  seems to  have been considered,  for  critics  rarely  comment  on this  possible
alteration of past works by new works. But implications of the poetic manifestation of
this  idea  may  be  much  more  literal  and  radical  than  the  seemingly  metaphorical
language in which it is conveyed in the essay. It may be considered more literal insofar
as Eliot, in his poems, actually alters the fragments he “borrows.” He also alters that
“existing order” of literature mentioned in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” by
sewing together fragments of  texts belonging to various periods of  literary history,
thus composing a new order, which is actually a disorder. 
14 The implications of the poetic near-equivalents for his theory of tradition are more
“radical” because Eliot, through his poetry, actually questions the value of the literary
text as such, building his own monument from the “old stones” of deconstructed, or
deconstructing texts. But what kind of monument is Eliot’s then? The mutual alteration
of past and present works could be compared to the mutual alteration of the diverse
fragments of his own poems, The Waste Land especially, or even of his different poems, if
we bear in mind the many “self-echoes” we can find throughout his poetry. Eliot writes
in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” that the poet who is  aware of this mutual
alteration  “will  be  aware  of  great  difficulties  and  responsibilities.”  What  are  those
“responsibilities” the poet should be aware of? One of them could be the responsibility
resulting from the inscription of a singular voice (“the individual talent”) on the canvas
of tradition. But if each individual poetic voice, each “individual talent,” in altering
tradition, inscribes itself in that tradition, then what is tradition? Shouldn’t we give the
essay another title, such as “Individual Talents and the Individual Talent?” or even,
“Tradition is Individual Talent”?
 
“And time yet for a hundred indecisions”: doubting in
tune
15 The idea of a constant alteration of the literary order, of an essential instability, is not
only expressed in his poetry, on what would be a poetic “expository mode,” but put into
play, actualized through his poetic writing, through his intertextual practice, but also
through the ambiguity of his syntax which sometimes renders the song of theory as
beguiling as open to revision or attunement:
It is impossible to say just what I mean!
But as if a magic lantern threw the nerves in patterns on a screen:
Would it have been worth while
If one, settling a pillow or throwing off a shawl,
And turning toward the window, should say:
‘That is not it at all,
That is not what I meant at all.’ (Eliot, 1974 6-7)
16 This desperate cry from the poetic voice of “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” could
first  be  interpreted  as  the  formulation  of  the  very  impossibility  to  formulate  its
intentions in an adequate and satisfying way (“just what I mean”). The projection of the
“nerves” on a screen could be seen as a way out of this inadequacy between intention
and expression through the representation of all the complex ramifications of the
speaker’s  thoughts.  But  the  adverb  “just”  could  also  express  restriction  and  the
sentence itself the fact that poetic writing, here in the guise of “speech” (“say”), always
exceeds the poet’s intentions (“what I mean”/”what I meant”). The image projected by
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the  “magic  lantern”  would  then  be  a  representation  of  this  very  impossibility  to
localize a core of meaning in the poem, because of its ramified nature. The poem is
made  of  “patterns”  of  “nerves.”  The  branching  out  it  stages  is  endless.  Then  the
presence of the colon followed by the use of the past conditional (“Would it have been”)
and the voicing of the feared inadequacy between that projected representation and
the  intention  of  some  “one”–another  speaker  or  the  same?–imply  that  even  the
projection  is  no  solution,  for  intention  and  expression  can  never  coalesce.  Behind
poetic  formulations  that  are  simple  in  appearance  but  rendered  ambiguous  by  the
choice of specific word sequences, grammatical forms (“It is impossible to,” “But as if”),
punctuation, and by quick shifts of tenses, lurks a possible theory of poetic expression
that  does  not  present  itself  as  entirely  formulated,  but  relies  instead  on  the  very
possibility of intellectual “visions and revisions.” 
17 The poem itself can never deliver its own manifesto as the other finite object it would
have been sketching while completing its own inscription as a poem, or a gem-like, self-
sufficient stanza shining among sister stanzas and begging to be read as manifesto. Like
the Chinese jar of “Burnt Norton,” it “still /Moves perpetually in its stillness […] /Or
say that the end precedes the beginning” (Eliot, 1974 182). If we distort this metaphor
and read the “end” as the theoretical message the poem would deliver or set out to
manifest, we can say that this “end” is already there when the reader starts reading the
poem. In other words, it cannot be said. This echoes the following remark in Eliot’s first
lecture given at Harvard, in November 1932: 
The critical mind operating in poetry, the critical effort which goes to the writing of
it, may always be in advance of the critical mind operating upon poetry, whether it
be one’s own or some one else’s. I only affirm that there is a significant relation
between the  best  poetry  and the  best  criticism of  the  same period.  The  age  of
criticism is also the age of critical poetry. And when I speak of modern poetry as
being extremely critical, I mean that the contemporary poet, who is not merely a
composer of  graceful  verses,–is  forced to ask himself  such questions as ‘what is
poetry for?’; not merely ‘what am I to say?’ but rather ‘how and to whom am I to say
it?’ (Eliot, 1950 30)
18 Eliot’s statements in the aftermath of his conversion have led some critics to read the
poems written after 1927 as “religious” ones, or at least as expressing a desire for some
kind of plenitude or absolute. But can this “heart” which seems to offer itself in his
later poems ever be “detached” from the peculiar form of writing that gives it life? Is
the discursive, dialectical nature of Four Quartets only a channel for the expression of
beliefs or concepts? Isn’t this peculiar mode itself the “belief” that is expressed by Eliot
at the latest stage of his career, the belief in the need for such dialectics, notably for the
dialectics of exclusion (“neither/nor”) and inclusion (“both/and”) which inscribe doubt
and the impossibility of closure as tenets one cannot reduce, when all has been sung
and done?
19 Denis Donoghue insists on the need to apprehend Eliot’s  poetry and especially Four
Quartets as positively “discursive,” that is, capable of creating concepts and generating
thought by its own, poetic, means: 
Most of the critical procedures that have been used in the analysis of poems have
concentrated upon image, symbol, and structure. No critical method has arisen that
proposes to show the poetic character and potentiality of discourse. It is still an
effort  to  take  the  harm  out  of  the  word  “discursive”  […]  It  might  have  been
expected,  especially  after  the  publication  of  Stevens’s  Notes  Towards  a  Supreme
Fiction, that a critical method sensitive to poetry as a work in the creation of new
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concepts  might  have  been  developed.  It  has  not  happened.  Readers  are  still
encouraged to believe that a poem is an action (or a structure) of words chiefly
concerned with the development of the resources of imagery and symbolism within
the fiction of dramatic monologue. The discrimination of concepts is regarded as fit
matter for an essay, but not for a poem. (Donoghue, 269) 
20 If, as Donoghue argues, “the discrimination of concepts” is usually not considered as
“fit matter” “for a poem”, it may be because the poetic mode summons other faculties
of the reader that are not considered primarily in their relation to the “discrimination
of concepts.” At the end of “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot writes that the
poet should live “in what is not merely the present, but the present moment of the
past.” In “Burnt Norton,” such a claim is developed on a poetic mode: “What might
have been and what has been /Point to one end, which is always present.” (Eliot, 1974
177) The experience of the rose-garden, around which the poem is built, is a pretext.
This idea of a possibility never actualized, “what might have been,” echoes “the present
moment of the past” Eliot mentioned in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” The
“one end” such an experience–or “non-experience”–points to, is the present moment
of the poem itself, the present of writing, in which this absent experience takes place. 
21 What is to be gained then, from this poetic form of aesthetic expression, compared to
the “expository mode” of his theoretical essays, even if his essays are far from exempt
of metaphors and poetic formulations? First, we may state the obvious: the “idea” or
“theory” expressed through repetitions, echoes and images, has more power to affect
the reader. But it is stronger, too, insofar as it is absolutely inseparable from the poem
in which it  incarnates itself.  Although the “statement” points to “what might have
been,” to the “passage which we did not take /Towards the door we never opened /Into
the  rose-garden”  (Eliot,  1974  177),  the  experience  is  present  in  the  poem,  in  what
appears  as  a  dream in  which  every  sensory  experience  is  always  one  echo  or  one
appearance away from reality:
Other echoes
Inhabit the garden. Shall we follow?
Quick, said the bird, find them, find them,
Round the corner. Through the first gate,
Into our first world, shall we follow
The deception of the thrush? Into our first world.
There they were, dignified, invisible,
Moving without pressure, over the dead leaves,
In the autumn heat, through the vibrant air,
And the bird called, in response to
The unheard music hidden in the shrubbery,
And the unseen eyebeam crossed, for the roses
Had the look of flowers that are looked at. (Eliot, 1974 177-8)
22 The music is “unheard,” the “eyebeam” that “crosse[s]” is “unseen” and the pool is
empty, only filled with illusion. The visit to the rose-garden is described only to be
revealed as an absent experience or the experience of absence, whose “end” is nothing
but the poem. The reader is invited to experience this absence on a poetic mode in the
first stanza of the poem, where the acoustic imprint of words left on the reader’s mind
is  certainly  not  meant  to  be  less  intense  than  any  experience  of  absence  in  an
unmediated form: 
Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.
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If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable.
What might have been is an abstraction
Remaining a perpetual possibility
Only in a world of speculation.
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present.
Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take
Towards the door we never opened
Into the rose-garden. My words echo 
Thus, in your mind.
But to what purpose
Disturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves
I do not know. (Eliot, 1974 177)
23 The “echo” of the words inscribed on the page is compared to the “footfalls” that “echo
in the memory /Down the passage which we did not take /Into the rose-garden.” These
words are like the residue of experience. The echo of a “footfall” is the acoustic trace of
a bodily experience one is no longer living; the emphasis put on the adverb “[t]hus,”
with the run-on-line and the following comma, is an invitation to experience the echo
itself. The printed words appear as echoes left in the wake of writing, awaiting a reader.
When we read them, we voice them mentally. By doing so, we actualize the “echo”
whose existence appears to our consciousness at the very moment when our eyes meet
this point in the syntax, this adverb that has been slightly deferred by the line break
after “echo.” At this point, poetic language is almost performative and what takes place
in the reader’s “mind” is the experience of the echo, tinged with the idea of the echo that
appeared  in  the  previous  lines  (“Footfalls  echo  in  the  memory…”).  The  isolated
sentence that follows is a threshold, an invitation to go beyond a limit, to “distur[b] the
dust on a bowl of rose-leaves.” The poet invites us to experience the impossible, to go
backward, back to a time when the roses whose remains are now covered with dust
were still living organisms. In the realm of poetic writing, the impossible is no longer
impossible, only purposeless; it does not know the limits of reality. Those limits are
represented and negated at the same time by this passage, or threshold: “But to what
purpose /Disturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves /I do not know,” which literally
opens the doors to the rose-garden, allowing the reader to experience the impossible
while reminding him all the way of the illusory nature of this experience, with such
sign-posts as “echoes,” “deception,” “invisible,” “unheard,” “hidden,” “unseen.” 
24 The visit to the rose-garden allows us to experience, through a sensory approach of
words, rhythm and even grammar, what the poetic voice presents as “deception.” But
as a dreamer can experience flying without ever having been a bird, the reader can
here  experience  the  possibility  of  living  an  unlived  experience  by  accepting  the
invitation of the poetic voice to “follow /The deception of the thrush.” The preterit,
which appears just after the formulation of this suggestion potentially accepted by the
reader, is the tense often used to relate dreams. But in the logic of “Burnt Norton,” it
corresponds to the revisiting of an experience that has been missed, a return “down
the passage which we did not take.” The experience of the impossible is made possible
through the use of an indicative verb form. The lines inscribe memories that lose the
name of “memories” since the experience they are supposed to point back to has never
been. The bird who leads us to the rose-garden is also the one who expels us: “Go, said
the bird: human kind /Cannot bear very much reality.” The experience of the rose-
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garden  ends  thus,  in  this  reversed  logic  presenting  “reality”  as  the  impossible
experience of the rose-garden itself. The end of this first part of the poem is a return to
a more discursive tone, echoing the first ten lines of the poem: “Time past and time
future /What might have been and what has been /Point to one end, which is always
present.” This could be a sentence from a philosophical essay or from the philosophical
works that could have come in lieu of the poems, following after his dissertation on the
philosophy of F. H. Bradley. The lines appear not as a comment meant to make the rose-
garden passage more explicit,  but  as  its  more discursive  counterpart.  The dialogue
between the two is the very dynamics of this first section. Because of their ambiguous
syntax and terms, the last lines are as open to thought and speculation as the previous,
imaginary depiction of the garden. The word “end” can mean the ultimate limit, the
most advanced point on the line of time; its use here would be either neutral or tinged
with determinism. Or it can mean “aim,” “purpose,” in which case it would suggest that
every experience whether actual  or  not,  has  no value in itself  because it  is  always
already  mediated  by  language  and  the  very  possibility  of  its  representation.  The
signifier “present” can also be understood in several ways. It can refer to the present,
suggesting that  any experience,  whether lived or only thought of,  is  an attempt to
grasp the present, to experience it as pure present. We can also understand that unreal
and actual experiences are considered with an equal mind because they point in the
same  direction,  they  point  to “one end;”  they  are  united  in  the  consciousness  as
movements of will, desire, memory or thought and this “end,” this intention, what is
aimed at, “is always present,” always there in the subject’s mind. Such a passage as the
beginning of “Burnt Norton” allows us to understand the intimate correlation between
the sensory experience of poetry and the experience of thought itself. 
25 In the first section of The Waste Land, the woman orders her interlocutor to “think:”
“What  are  you  thinking  of?  What  thinking?  What? /I  never  know  what  you  are
thinking. Think.” The answer comes as a “poetic” answer: “I think we are in rat’s alley /
Where  the  dead men lost  their  bones.”  It  calls  upon our  imagination,  forces  us  to
consider all  the possible meanings and connotations of the signifiers present in the
sequence and of the possible meanings they acquire through their co-presence in this
singular linguistic occurrence. Yet the speaker asserts that he is thinking, not merely
dreaming  nor  imagining.  We  can  infer  that  “thinking  of”  is  not  enough.  Thinking
should not only mean relating to a specific object of thought, but trying to create that
object  through language  while  experiencing  the  thought  itself,  in  the  deepest  way
possible. This echoes Eliot’s idea about Donne – not lacking in reality just because it
might have  been  true–,  “A  thought  to  Donne  was  an  experience;  it  modified  his
sensibility.” (Eliot, 1951 287)
26 In Ash-Wednesday, the poetic voice seems to be looking for a transcendental Word, or
signifier,  but  in fact  this  word is  a  lost  word.  The advent of  the “still  point  of  the
turning  world”  around  which  the  Four  Quartets revolve  is  announced  in  Ash-
Wednesday: “And the light shone in darkness and /Against the Word the unstilled world
still whirled /About the centre of the silent Word.” (Eliot, 1974 192) The “silent word” is
as devoid of substance as the “point.” Yet because it has a “centre,” it is a centre. This
“lost word” is not a word whose trace has been lost, but a trace whose origin has always
already  been  lost.  In  the  “silent  word”  we  can  hear  an  echo  of  a  non  assignable
presence necessary to the movement of the “turning world” and of the “turning words”
that  constitute  the  poem.  The  “word”  the  poetic  voice  wishes  to  hear  “cannot  be
found.” It can only be heard as a re-sounding word: “Where shall the word be found,
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where will the word /Resound? Not here, there is not enough silence.” (Eliot, 1974 92)
The verb “resound” suggests the ambiguity at work in this passage. It evokes the echo
of words that would be a proof of presence and the repetition of a sound that is always
already lost. Ash-Wednesday, the poem that would most readily qualify as one of Eliot’s
religious poems, thus offers the means of its own deconstruction and of the hollowing
out of its own commentary.
 
The odour of discourse
27 In his essay “The Metaphysical Poets” Eliot praises those poets, like John Donne, who
could “feel their thoughts as immediately as the odour of a rose” (Eliot, 1951 287) and
laments on what he calls the “dissociation of sensibility.” But paradoxically, and maybe
against his will, Eliot himself encouraged, to some extent, such a dissociation between
the ideas formulated in his essays and the feelings and sensations provoked by the
sensory experience of reading his poems, by the authoritative, uncompromising and
nipping tone of  his  essays,  revealing,  more than anything else,  a  need to  convince
himself, a tone that may have turned the reader’s attention to this mode of discourse
while freezing the theoretical potential of his own poems. Why the need to translate
the  “fragrance”  of  his  poems  into  theoretical  discourse?  The  essay  on  “The
Metaphysical  Poets”  is  a  call  for  a  unification  of  the  reader’s  sensibility,  but  it
eventually refers the reader to the poems themselves, to the aesthetic experience of
reading. Eliot’s readers should be able to “feel [his] thoughts as immediately as” they
hear the sounds of his poem. Such a sensory apprehension of thought is less easily
achieved when reading his  essays.  His  particular  tone goes  along with the need to
define what a good poem is. Yet the sometimes simplistic dialectics of Eliot’s essays
seems to be soluble in his poetry. In “East Coker” for example, he develops the idea that
only the attempt matters: 
So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years–
Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l’entre deux guerres–
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure (Eliot, 1974 190)
28 Such poetics of failure develops itself through a constant oscillation between poetry
and comments. The comments are not really meta-poetic because they comment on
nothing but what is contiguous within the poem itself; they do not refer to poetry in
general, but to the poem which gives them shape. In “East Coker” again, after a stanza
dedicated to the development of poetic images (the “late November,” “late roses,” the
“constellations”), he writes:
That was a way of putting it–not very satisfactory:
A periphrastic study in a worn-out poetical fashion,
Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle
With words and meanings. The poetry does not matter. (Eliot, 1974 186)
29 Later in the poem, he imagines the reader’s reaction to other poetic images that have
just been developed, then reformulates and reasserts in more discursive terms what he
has just tried to express through that development of images:
You say I am repeating
Something I have said before. I shall say it again.
Shall I say it again? In order to arrive there,
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To arrive where you are, to get from where you are not,
You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy. (Eliot, 1974 188)
30 The  conversational  structure  retained,  in  spite  of  the  relative  deficiency  of  the
potential interlocutor, in some of Eliot’s earlier poems allows him to create speakers
who speak for his poetry as much as they speak for themselves. His poetic “program”
then manifests itself in the conflicts that emerge between these divergent voices. In
“Conversation Galante” or “Portrait of a Lady,” the feminine voice asserts, in a more or
less direct way, a number of principles against which the masculine voice can stand. In
“Conversation Galante,” the poetic digressions of the masculine voice, for instance, are
attacked by the lady who considers his metaphors useless and sterile, in spite of the
swollen, not to say pregnant aspect of the object chosen here as an image:
I observe: ‘Our sentimental friend the moon!
Or possibly (fantastic, I confess)
It may be Prester John’s balloon
Or an old battered lantern hung aloft
To light poor travellers to their distress.’
She then: ‘How you digress!’ (Eliot, 1974 25)
31 In the last stanza, the poet acknowledges his own tendency to digress, and formulates,
in a  self-derisive tone,  what can still  be considered as  a  poetic  manifesto,  however
“mad” it may be:
‘You, madam, are the eternal humorist,
The eternal enemy of the absolute,
Giving our vagrant moods the slightest twist!
With your air indifferent and imperious
At a stroke our mad poetics to confute–(Eliot, 1974 25)
32 The lines seem to “follow like a tedious argument /Of insidious intent,”3 under cover of
a polite or domestic argument. The “logic of imagination” as Eliot calls it in his preface
to Saint John Perse’s Anabasis, opposes the logic and syntax of rational discourse.
33 It would be interesting to confront “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” and the essay
“Hamlet,” in which he presents the now famous concept of “objective correlative.” In
“Hamlet,” Eliot defines the “objective correlative” thus: “The only way of expressing
emotion  is  by  finding  an  ‘objective  correlative;’  in  other  words,  a  set  of  objects,  a
situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such
that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given,
the emotion is immediately evoked.” He provides an example of such failure to find an
appropriate  “formula,”  namely  Shakespeare’s  Hamlet,  thus  criticizing  Shakespeare
himself: “Hamlet, like the sonnets, is full of some stuff that the writer could not drag to
light, contemplate, or manipulate into art.” (Eliot, 1951 145)
34 What we find in “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” is in fact the poetic manifestation
of the difficulty to find “the verbal equivalents for states of mind and feeling,” a “task”
in  which  the  Metaphysical  Poets  themselves  were  engaged.  (Eliot,  1951  289)  The
speaker cannot speak, finds it impossible to “say just what [he] means!” He cannot find
apt  equivalents  for  his  overwhelming  emotions  or  intentions  that  remain  an
“overwhelming question” hovering over the poem. As David Spurr writes, 
The conflict between purposive action and aimless movement coincides throughout
the poem with a similar thematic opposition between discourse and the inarticulate
[…]  the  language  of  discourse,  like  the  language  of  spatial  movement,  leads
deceptively toward what appears as a destination in the “overwhelming question”
before shutting the door in our faces: “ Oh, do not ask, ‘What is it?’” (Spurr, 1984 5)
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35 The voice of “Prufrock” invokes Hamlet, too, just as Eliot does in the essay in which he
defines the “objective correlative:” “No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be.”
(Eliot, 1974 7) The poet seems to stress the difference between the persona of “Prufrock”
and Hamlet as a tragic character unable to find verbal equivalents for his emotions, but
also the difference between addressing that problem on a critical mode, as he does in
“Hamlet,”  and turning that  problem into  an object,  or  even shaping a  problematic
object,  the  poem  itself,  an  object  resulting  from  the  “contemplat[ion]”  and
“manipulat[ion] into art” of the “stuff” he may not always have been able “to drag to
light” in his essays. The mask of Hamlet, which, as mask, displays the very impossibility
of adequacy and identity, could actually be the untimely “verbal equivalent” for that
impossibility  to  find an “objective  correlative,”  for  the “state  of  mind and feeling”
which consists in not being able to find any equivalent. 
36 Eliot’s essays are full of digressions and contradictions. His sometimes dogmatic, not to
say patronizing, voice in his essays may just be the consequence or the symptom of a
difficulty to objectify his own ideas, which are also “states of mind and feeling,” or to
objectify the desire and possible failure of objectification itself. The poems then offer
themselves as a means to do so in a perhaps more persuasive way, because they are,
first and foremost, objects that result from a “drag[ging] to light and manipulat[ing]
into art” that can now be experienced and felt; and whatever “thoughts” they are made
of are to be felt “as immediately as the odour of a rose.”
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NOTES
1. Cf. “[…] the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who
suffers and the mind which creates;” T. S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Selected
Essays [1932], London, Faber and Faber, 1952, 18.
2. “Various critics have done me the honour to interpret the poem in terms of criticism of the
contemporary world, have considered it, indeed, as an important bit of social criticism. To me it
was only the relief of a personal and wholly insignificant grouse against life; it is just a piece of
rhythmical  grumbling.”  Quoted  by  the  late  Professor  Theodore  Spencer  during  a  lecture  at
Harvard University, and recorded by the late Henry Ware Eliot, Jr., the poet’s brother. Valerie
Eliot, ed., The Waste Land. A Facsimile and Transcript of the Original Drafts, Orlando, Harcourt, Inc.,
1971, 1.
3. Cf. “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock :” “Streets that follow like a tedious argument /Of
insidious intent.” (Eliot, 1974 3)
ABSTRACTS
The provocative tone of T.S. Eliot’s essays and lectures and their occasional lack of nuance largely
account for the poet’s reputation as a figure of authority and as an advocate of a traditional,
conservative brand of modernism. But Eliot has never ceased underlining the capacity of poetry
to deliver its own poetics, on a mode which allows a sensory approach to thought and meaning
and prevents closure.  I  will  try to confront some of the theoretical  assertions present in his
essays and lectures with his aesthetic “theory” as it incarnates itself, or as it is “sung” in some of
his poems, and attempt to show what theory can gain from this peculiar mode of discourse that
only poetic writing can generate. 
Le ton provocateur des essais et conférences de T.S. Eliot et le manque de nuance de certaines
déclarations ont largement contribué à ériger le poète en figure d’autorité et en chantre d’un
modernisme  traditionnel  et  conservateur.  Eliot  n’a  cependant  jamais  cessé  de  souligner  la
capacité de la poésie à délivrer sa propre poétique, sur un mode qui permet d’approcher le sens à
travers  les  sens  et  empêche  de  le  circonscrire.  Je  tenterai  donc  de  confronter  certains  des
préceptes théoriques formulés dans ses essais et conférences avec sa « théorie » esthétique telle
qu’elle s’incarne, ou telle qu’elle est « chantée » dans certains de ses poèmes, en essayant de
montrer ce que la théorie peut retirer de ce mode particulier de discours que seule l’écriture
poétique est capable de générer. 
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